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I.

Introduction

Here is a philosophical inquiry along the lines of the “if a tree falls in the
forest” question, but offered to those studying the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the United States Congress, especially during times of
congressional gridlock: If Congress passes a new law which changes the
meaning of an earlier statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court, but no one
in Congress is aware that the new law reverses the Court’s interpretation of
the earlier statute, has Congress really “overridden” the Court?
In a pathbreaking 1991 study of congressional overrides, Yale law
professor William N. Eskridge found a rise during the 1970s and 1980s in the
number of times that Congress consciously overrode Supreme Court
interpretations of congressional statutes.1 As Eskridge explained his focus on
deliberate congressional action, the term “override” does not “include
statutes for which the legislative history—mainly committee reports and
hearings—does not reveal a legislative focus on judicial decisions.”2

* J.D. 2014, UC Irvine School of Law.
** Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. We thank
Matt Christiansen, Bill Eskridge, and Deborah Widiss for generously sharing their data and
thoughts, and Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Liptak for useful comments and suggestions.
1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991) (defining an “override” as “any time Congress reacts consciously to,
and modifies a statutory interpretation decision.” (emphasis added)).
2. Id. As evidenced by this language, legislative consciousness was not merely one factor in
determining whether a statute qualified as an override; it was an essential element of the definition
of an override.
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Replicating Eskridge’s methodology and updating the Eskridge study
through 2012, we found that the number of conscious congressional
overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations had fallen markedly
after 1991 and had slowed during the Obama presidency to a trickle.3 The
Hasen study suggested that increased party polarization in Congress was
responsible for the decline in overrides since the Eskridge study, as well as
for the shift from bipartisan overrides to more partisan overrides.4
Now, in a fascinating and wide-ranging study published in the Texas Law
Review,5 Matthew R. Christiansen and Professor Eskridge disagree with
some of the conclusions of the Hasen study, both on the extent to which
overrides have declined in the 1990s and also whether political polarization
will likely keep the number of overrides low for the foreseeable future during
periods of divided government.6
The Christiansen–Eskridge study offers important and counterintuitive
insights on the nature of congressional legislation enacted following Supreme
Court statutory interpretation. However, as well explained by Professor
Deborah Widiss in her perceptive analysis,7 the Christiansen–Eskridge study
has shifted the meaning of “override” compared to the earlier Eskridge 1991
and Hasen studies. Instead of a study of conscious overrides, the
Christiansen–Eskridge study uses new methodology to study cases in which
congressional action consciously or unconsciously changed the understanding
of a congressional statute as the Supreme Court had interpreted it.8 In other

3. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and
Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013). “In fact, in the last two decades the rate of
congressional overriding of Supreme Court statutory decisions has plummeted dramatically, from
an average of twelve overrides of Supreme Court cases in each two-year congressional term during
the 1975–1990 period, to an average of 5.8 overrides for each term from 1991–2000, and to a mere
2.8 average number of overrides for each term from 2001–2012.” Id. See also id. at 211 n.29
(noting the replication of Eskridge’s methodology for a later time period). Hasen wrote the article
and Buatti served as Hasen’s research assistant, gathering and helping to analyze the data. They are
co-authors of this Response.
4. Id. at 209.
5. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1317 (2014).
6. The authors open their article by attacking “the New York Times” for claiming “that overrides
had fallen off dramatically after 1991 and that in the new millennium ‘[t]he number of overrides has
fallen to almost none.’” Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1318 (quoting Adam Liptak, In
Congress’s Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-power-from-paralysisofcongress.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GMQ4-KS4D). As they acknowledge, Liptak was
quoting Hasen on that point and citing Hasen’s study. This seems like a case of shooting the
messenger. In any case, by the end of the study, the authors seem to agree that overrides have fallen
dramatically; it is only that the decline happened a bit later according to their calculations. See id. at
1319 (“After 1998, however, we found that overrides declined as dramatically as they had ascended,
though they have not (yet) ‘fallen to almost none.’”).
7. Deborah A. Widiss, Identifying Congressional Overrides Should Not Be This Hard, 92
TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 145, 146 (2014).
8.
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words, the new study includes statutes in which there is no indication
Congress knew that it was overriding a Supreme Court decision through a
new statute. This methodology capturing inadvertent overrides depends in
part upon ex post Westlaw coding, conducted by a West research attorney,
that a Congressional statute overrode or otherwise modified a Supreme Court
interpretation of a statute.9 While unconscious overrides can be important to
study for many reasons, they are less relevant for purposes of studying the
Congress–Supreme Court dialogue.
Importantly, however, the Christiansen–Eskridge methodology also
provides a much better way of identifying conscious overrides than the
methodology used in either the original Eskridge 1991 or Hasen studies, and
it has led us to add 25 additional conscious overrides to the 1991–2012
period of the Hasen study. Nonetheless, looking only at conscious overrides
identified in the Hasen study and augmented by the later Christiansen–
Eskridge study, we conclude that the Christiansen–Eskridge study mostly
supports the two main claims of the Hasen study: (1) conscious overrides are
on the decline, precipitously so in recent years, and (2) partisan polarization
is to blame.10
This short Response makes four points. First, for purposes of measuring
Congress–Supreme Court relations, it makes sense to limit a study of
overrides to conscious overrides. Second, the Hasen study and Christiansen–
Eskridge study, while differing in their particulars, are consistent in finding a
marked decline in conscious overrides, especially during the Obama
As discussed more fully below, Hasen, using the methodology first pioneered by
Professor Eskridge in his 1991 study, identified overrides primarily by looking for
statements in Congressional committee reports that indicated an intent to override a
prior decision; in the new study, Christiansen and Eskridge combine review of
legislative history with a review of all court decisions on Westlaw that flagged a prior
precedent as having been affected by subsequent statutory action. Thus, although
Christiansen and Eskridge do not characterize their research methods in this matter,
they moved from a methodology that focuses primarily on ex ante signals from
Congress to one that relies heavily on ex post analysis by courts. Below, I do original
analysis of Christiansen and Eskridge’s data and find that the data set of overrides they
identified differed from Hasen’s not only in number but also in kind. In short, the
Congress-centered methodology that Hasen employed was far more effective at
identifying overrides that Christiansen and Eskridge classify as “restorative” and
“deep” than it was at identifying updating or clarifying overrides.
Id. at 147. See also id. at 149–52 (contrasting methodologies in detail). We find it somewhat odd
that in their Reply to this Response, Christiansen, Eskridge, and Thypin-Bermeo so strongly attack
the focus on congressional consciousness. That focus originated in the Eskridge 1991 study and
was merely replicated in the Hasen study. Matthew R. Christiansen, William N. Eskridge Jr., &
Samuel N. Thypin-Bermeo, The Conscious Congress: How Not to Define Overrides, ___ TEXAS L.
REV. SEE ALSO ___ (2015). In addition, although the authors appear to suggest the Hasen study and
this Response focused solely on committee reports in determining conscious congressional override
attempts, we did not do so. See infra note 33 (describing the methodology in detail).
9. For an explanation of their methodology, see Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at
1328–29.
10. Hasen, supra note 3, at 209.
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administration—a trend which continued through 2014. Third, committee
reports and legislative history surprisingly do not appear to have become a
less reliable way of identifying overrides. Fourth, political polarization best
explains the decline in conscious overrides, and there is good reason to
believe the trend will continue during periods of divided government, with
spurts of (conscious) overriding during periods of united government, until
political polarization diminishes.
I.

Why Focus on Conscious Overrides?

The Christiansen–Eskridge study is a tour de force, offering new insights
on many questions, including a relative assessment of how “discrete and
insular minorities” fare in Congress compared to the Supreme Court and the
role of executive agencies in influencing the subsequent judicial
interpretation of legislation.11
However, the Christiansen–Eskridge study’s methodological change in
defining “overrides” makes it a poor choice to determine the scope of the
Congressional–Supreme Court dialogue over statutory interpretation. The
Eskridge 1991 and Hasen studies both illustrate the extent to which Congress
has been willing and able to consciously override Supreme Court statutory
interpretation decisions. Such overrides first rose dramatically and have now
fallen to a very low level. The Christiansen–Eskridge study, by including
numerous examples of congressional statutes which inadvertently override
Supreme Court precedent, does not shed as much light on the interbranch
relationship.
As Professor Widiss explains:
[I]n moving to the Westlaw approach, Christiansen and Eskridge most
likely lose at least to some extent a distinction that the Eskridge 1991
study and Hasen both emphasized, between statutory amendments in
which Congress “consciously intends” to enact an override and
statutory amendments that might “implicitly” supersede a prior
decision.12

The most useful part of their study for understanding interbranch
relationships is their study of “restorative” overrides, which Professor Widiss
found overlap a great deal (73%) with the conscious overrides in the
Eskridge 1991 and Hasen studies.13 Indeed, Christiansen and Eskridge call

11. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1381, 1477. We do not disagree with
Christiansen and Eskridge that both the Supreme Court and the Executive are likely winners during
a sustained decline in overrides. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 208 n.15 (drawing a parallel between
the Supreme Court’s and the presidency’s growing power against Congress).
12. Widiss, supra note 7, at 152.
13. Id. at 155.
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restorative overrides the types of overrides which “garner the most attention
and most obviously reflect institutional conflict.”14 Limiting one’s study to
conscious congressional overrides keys into the “dialogic” model of
interbranch relations. As explained in the Hasen study:
The governing model of congressional-Supreme Court relations is that
the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation: Congress
writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress has the
power to overrule the Court’s interpretations. The Court’s interpretive
rules are premised upon this dialogic model, such as the rule that
Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents are subject to
“super strong” stare decisis protection because Congress can always
correct an errant court interpretation.15

A key conclusion of the Hasen study is that the dialogue has changed in a
significant way: conscious congressional overrides have declined
precipitously, and this decline means that the Court’s power to decide the
scope of federal law has concomitantly increased.16
The Court’s
interpretation of congressional statutes has become nearly as final as its
understanding of the U.S. Constitution. This finding has many implications.
Perhaps most importantly for Supreme Court doctrine, the Court’s continued
use of a super-strong stare decisis for interpreting statutes may no longer be
justifiable given Congress’s practical inability to participate the dialogue.
Federal statutory law is exceedingly complex, and the Christiansen–
Eskridge study shows one measure of complexity: even when Congress is
unaware of its effect on judicial precedent, it is changing the meaning of
statutes which have been interpreted earlier by the Supreme Court. But this
somnambulist Congress is no more engaging in a dialogue with the Supreme
Court than someone talking in his or her sleep is engaging in a dialogue with
a spouse. If we care about the relative power of the branches, a focus on
consciousness makes sense.

14. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1374.
15. Hasen, supra note 3, at 208. The term “super-strong” stare decisis originates with Professor
Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362
(1988).
16. As Professor Widiss explains:
Hasen’s override database thus differed significantly from Christiansen and Eskridge’s
as to the kind of override included, as well as to the overall number of overrides
included. Accordingly, one possible conclusion is that ex ante committee-reportfocused research, as supplemented by secondary sources, does a relatively good job of
identifying “restorative” overrides and “deep” overrides (which are themselves heavily
overlapping categories), whereas the ex post Westlaw-based research captures far more
of the interplay between large-scale reorganizations of statutory law and existing
precedents.
Widiss, supra note 7, at 155.
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There is one potential justification for the Christiansen–Eskridge ex post
measure of overrides: the authors claim Congress is using committee reports
less, making evidence of congressional intent to override the Supreme Court
harder to find and raising the potential that some intentional overrides could
escape under the methodology used in the Eskridge 1991 and Hasen
studies.17 However, it seems wrong to include all of these ex post declared
overrides in a count of conscious overrides. If there is no mention of a
conscious override in committee reports or other legislative materials, such
as floor statements or hearings, it does not seem fair to say that a majority in
Congress (or even much less than a majority) had a conscious intent to
override the Supreme Court.
We recognize that Congress is a “they,” not an “it,”18 and for any given
statute a Member of Congress, staffer, or lobbyist who drafted a measure
may have harbored an intent to override the Supreme Court. But absent any
communication in some form to the rest of Congress of this intent, or any
other indication that Congress or the public considered legislation to be a
response to the Supreme Court, it is wrong to count a mere effect on statutory
interpretation following Supreme Court and congressional action as an
override.
As Widiss emphasizes,19 there is no good way right now to accurately
track all congressional overrides. All methodologies have errors. One has to
decide whether to potentially miss cases because of the absence of good
legislative history (the Eskridge 1991 and Hasen strategies) or to be vastly
overinclusive and include cases for which no one in Congress intended an
override (the Christiansen and Eskridge study). For purposes of studying
interbranch relations, the first error is more acceptable especially because, as
we show in the next Part, the decline in the value of committee reports may
not be as severe as Christiansen and Eskridge believe.
Fortunately, there is a way to have the best of both worlds. We now
believe the best solution for identifying conscious overrides (short of
Congress adopting Professor Widiss’s suggestion to publicly announce such
overrides) is to use the new Christiansen–Eskridge methodology as a first cut
for capturing overrides and then carefully examine that large set to separate
conscious overrides from the rest. In short, Christiansen and Eskridge have
designed a much better net for catching tuna, but they inadvertently are also
capturing even more dolphins which need to be thrown back in the water.

17. “The paucity of overrides in [Hasen’s] study is, in large part, the result of the radical decline
of committee reports as a useful source of information for major legislation.” Christiansen &
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1328.
18. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). As applied to courts, see Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is
a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
549 (2005).
19. Widiss, supra note 7, at 147.
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In the next Part, we show that if we focus solely on conscious overrides,
the conclusions of the two studies are quite similar. Of the 80 extra
“overrides” identified in the Christiansen–Eskridge study but not the Hasen
study as overrides, 25 demonstrate congressional intent to consciously
override Congress.
II. The Revised Evidence Shows a Decline in Conscious Overrides,
Especially Since 2000, But an Uncertain Decline in the Value of
Committee Reports for Identifying Overrides
Although Christiansen–Eskridge and Hasen both found a dramatic
decline in overrides between 2001–2011,20 they differed greatly with respect
to the 1991–2000 period. Where Hasen found a less dramatic but still
significant decline in conscious overrides,21 Christiansen–Eskridge
proclaimed this same period as the “golden age, both quantitatively and
qualitatively.”22 In preparing this Response, we examined these disparate
findings and accounted for them. We hypothesized that Christiansen and
Eskridge’s decision to include unconscious overrides would explain much of
the difference, as would gaps in Hasen’s methodology resulting both from
technical search limitations and the “radical” decline in the value of
committee reports.23
A. A Revised Measure of the Decline in Conscious Overrides
Apparently anticipating concerns that their wider net was producing false
positives, the Christiansen–Eskridge study carefully coded whether the
legislative history of each override they found contained (a) “[a] mention
of . . . the override provision;” or (b) “the problems with the Supreme Court
decision subsequently overridden.”24 Christiansen and Eskridge provided
Professor Widiss with their raw data on this point for her use in preparing her
response to their study. Based on her analysis of this data, Professor Widiss
noted that “in a high percentage (approximately 85%) [of overrides identified
by the study] there was at least some explicit mention” of (a) or (b).25 The
fact that the remaining 15% are not mentioned in any legislative history
materials straightforwardly explains why the Hasen study did not identify

20. Compare Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1340–41, with Hasen, supra note 3, at
209.
21. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 209. For the 1991–2000 period, Hasen found 5.8 overrides per
session, a decline from 12 overrides per session during the 1975–1990 period. Id.
22. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1337. Christiansen and Eskridge found an
average of over 20 overrides per session during the overlapping 1991–1999 period. Id. at 1337.
23. See supra note 17.
24. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 151 (citing Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1534,
app. 3 (describing criteria)).
25. Id.
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most of them.26 According to the data collected by Christiansen and
Eskridge and reviewed by Professor Widiss, this accounted for 15 overrides
that the Christiansen–Eskridge study identified but the Hasen study did not,
11 of which occurred during the 1991–1998 period. 27
However, this 15-override difference only tells part of the story. In
examining an updated set of data that Christiansen and Eskridge kindly
provided us,28 we noted that a significant number of cases satisfied either (a)
or (b) but not both; that is to say, some overrides identified by the
Christiansen–Eskridge study contained mentions of the override provision
but not any corresponding Supreme Court case (and vice versa). While we
agree that legislative-history materials noting problems with Supreme Court
interpretations—what we call the “(b)” coding—are likely to signal
conscious overrides, mentions of override provisions only—the “(a)”
coding—are not. As explained above, we generally did not identify as
overrides any statutes for which there was no evidence Congress was
responding negatively to a Supreme Court decision.29
In all overlapping years, the Christiansen–Eskridge study’s data
contained 38 overrides not identified in the Hasen study30 for which the
legislative history materials failed to discuss an overridden Supreme Court
case. This accounted for nearly half of the extra overrides identified by
Christiansen and Eskridge. Of the 38 unconscious overrides, 31 occurred
during the disputed 1991–2000 period.31
Notably, 4 additional overrides identified by the Christiansen–Eskridge
study but not by the Hasen study mentioned Supreme Court cases in
committee hearings but not in committee reports.32 While discussions in
hearings may potentially signal a conscious override, we agree with
Professor Widiss that hearing testimony is a less reliable indicator of

26. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 332 n.1 (requiring a conscious reaction by Congress and, in
most cases, a legislative focus on judicial decisions). Although the data compiled by Christiansen
and Eskridge, and reviewed by Professor Widiss, classified 18 overrides during the 1991–2011
period as “unmentioned,” three of these overrides were nonetheless identified by the Hasen study.
See Hasen, supra note 3, at 252–55 app. 1. These were Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960),
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994), and Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991).
27. Widiss, supra note 7, at 146–47; Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1480–94 app.1;
Hasen, supra note 3, at 252–55 app. 1.
28. We noted some discrepancies between the data analyzed by Professor Widiss and
Christiansen and Eskridge’s updated data. Any such discrepancies are likely attributable to the
updating process that occurred after the publication of the Christiansen–Eskridge article and
Professor Widiss’s article.
29. See supra note 28.
30. There were 40 overrides that did not discuss the corresponding Supreme Court case in a
report or hearing. Of these 40, two were identified by the Hasen study: Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S.
115 (1994), and United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145 (1965). The fact that Hoffman and
Demarest are not on this wider list is one of the discrepancies we noted. See supra note 26.
31. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1480–94 app. 1; Hasen, supra note 3, at 252–55
app. 1.
32. See supra note 31.
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Congressional intent than committee reports.33 Still, we counted such
mentions in our own recoding of the data, and erred on the side of including
close cases as conscious overrides.
Specifically, we examined the legislative history of the remaining 42
overrides to determine whether they qualified as conscious overrides. For
each override, we followed several steps: first, to test for gaps in Hasen’s34
and Eskridge’s 199135 methodology, we ran a search for case names or
portions of case names within the results of Hasen’s initial USCCAN-REP
search.36 Second, we ran a search for the same case names or portions of
case names within the entire USCCAN-REP database. We reviewed any
reports that resulted from this search. Third, we searched through any
hearings linked by Westlaw to the override’s public law number, including in
any compiled legislative histories. Lastly, we searched for case names or
portions of case names in Westlaw’s Congressional Testimony database.37
To sort conscious overrides from unconscious overrides, we applied the
same definition as the Hasen and Eskridge 1991 studies: a conscious override
is a statute that completely overrules, modifies in a material way, or modifies
the consequences of, a Supreme Court statutory decision and for which the
legislative history—mainly committee reports and hearings—explicitly states
or clearly implies Congress’ conscious intent to do so.38 Thus, the legislative
history of conscious overrides must, at the very least, reveal a legislative
focus on judicial decisions.39 We define any override that falls outside this

33. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 151–52 (citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN L. REV. 901, 977 fig.8 (2013)). While we consider
committee reports to be a superior indicator of congressional intent, we did not limit our search to
committee reports only. We looked to any indicator of conscious congressional intent, including
committee hearings and even bill titles. For example, see Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638
(1990), overridden by the 1995 law and described by Westlaw as “Reversal of Adams Fruit Co. v.
Barrett.” Reversal of Adams Fruit Company, Inc. v. Barrett, Pub. L. No. 104-49, 109 Stat. 432
(1995) (Westlaw). See also Hasen, supra note 3, at 260 n.3.
34. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 259 (running the following search in the USCCAN-REP
database: “(OVERRUL! MODIF! CORRECT! CLARIF! REVERS! REJECT! DISAGREE!
ERRONEOUS! MISINTERPRET! OVERTURN! RESTOR!) /10 ‘SUPREME COURT’ & date(aft
1990)”).
35. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 336–37 (searching printed USCCAN reports for every time a
proposed statutory provision “overruled,” “modified,” or “clarified” a federal judicial interpretation
of a statute, and supplementing “this method with a more selective search” of other sources).
36. For the purposes of this test, we coded an override as “caught” by the Hasen methodology if
a report section uncovered by this search could have reasonably led researchers to conclude that the
report contained a potential conscious override. We also coded an override as “caught” if the Hasen
methodology uncovered another case overridden by the same public law, even if the methodology
did not directly uncover the exact report in which the override was expressed.
37. Importantly, Westlaw’s Congressional Testimony coverage does not begin until 1993,
although we were able to locate quite a few hearings that occurred prior to 1993 through Westlaw’s
legislative history materials.
38. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 211 n.29 (citing Eskridge, supra note 1, at 332 n.1).
39. Id.
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definition to be an unconscious override. This distinction could fairly be
criticized for requiring significant judgment; reasonable minds could
disagree as to whether a specific close case qualifies as conscious or not.
However, we do not believe we are adding anything new to the criteria
already listed in the Hasen or Eskridge 1991 studies and thus are not
exercising any greater degree of judgment than was involved in past
scholarship.40
Upon completing our review, we found that 25 cases not found by
Hasen’s team did indeed qualify as conscious overrides, giving the benefit of
the doubt by counting close cases as a conscious overrides. We have updated
Hasen’s 2012 Appendix to account for them.41 Many of these conscious
overrides were not picked up by Hasen’s methodology due to Congress’ use
of indirect override language in reports.42 Several others were identified by
Hasen’s methodology and were determined to not be conscious overrides, but
review of additional hearings or reports coded by the Christiansen–Eskridge
study convinced us otherwise.43 Given the size and complexity of these
projects, coding error was also a minor factor.44 We mostly attribute the
remaining 17 disputed overrides to differences in judgment and definitional
differences resulting from the Christiansen–Eskridge study’s ex post courtfocused approach (coding these overrides so long as they have an effect upon
40. That identifying overrides has never been easy was a key theme of Professor Widiss’
insightful article. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 147 (“[A]s emphasized by the quotation that opened
this essay and a similar statement by Hasen, both research teams agree that it is very difficult to
identify overrides.”).
41. See infra Appendix 1.
42. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-220, at 701 (1997) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1129, 1512–13 (discussing the outcome for the taxpayer in Commissioner v. Lundy,
516 U.S. 235 (1996), and how the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.,
and 46 app.) would give the taxpayer a different result). Congressional reports occasionally employ
a multiple-paragraph structure in which Congress will describe the state of the law, attribute that
law to the Supreme Court, and then in a separate paragraph state its intent to change the law without
explicitly contradicting the Supreme Court. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-364(I), at 53–54 (1997),
reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 725 (using the multiple-paragraph structure to override Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), with the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. app.,
16 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.)); S.
REP. NO. 105-174, at 54 (1998) (discussing U.S. v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995), in the same
manner). Where the implication is clear, we count this as an override. Difficulty catching overrides
that follow this structure is one limitation of Hasen’s search methodology, which requires override
language to occur within 10 words of “Supreme Court.” See supra note 34.
43. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law of the Comm. of the
Judiciary, H.R., 103d Cong. 220 (1994) (discussing Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991), in the
course of passing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 310 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)–(2) (1994)); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. S., 103d Cong. 206 (1993) (discussing Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993), in a similar manner).
44. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-63, at 21 (1997) (overriding Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S.
168 (1993), with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997); H.R. REP. 105-220, at 463 n.35 (1993) (Conf.
Rep.) (same). This was identified by Hasen’s search and it is a conscious override.
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a case’s holding and a mention of the Supreme Court case in legislative
history materials) and Hasen’s and Eskridge’s 1991 ex ante legislative
approach (requiring an affirmative statement or clear implication by
Congress that it was consciously responding to, and altering, a Supreme
Court statutory holding).45
Importantly, many of the additional conscious overrides missed by the
original Hasen study but caught by reanalyzing the Christiansen–Eskridge
data are additional overrides in the same laws already identified by the Hasen
study as containing overrides. For example, two additional overrides came
from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and three
additional overrides came from the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.46
Adding these additional 25 conscious overrides to the Hasen study raised
the total number to 71, up from 46.47 This is a major increase, and evidence
that Christiansen and Eskridge’s methodology—despite producing a large
number of false positives—is extremely effective at locating conscious
overrides. These additional overrides would raise the Hasen study’s
estimates during the during the disputed 1991–2000 period from 5.8 per
session to 9.4 per session.48 Despite the size of this increase, it still
constitutes a decline from the 1975–1990 period.49 Revised numbers for
conscious overrides during the 2001–2012 period went from 2.8 to 4 per
session.50 While this too is a significant increase from the original numbers,
it still constitutes a precipitous decline from the previous periods.
Further, the trend in the Obama presidency through 2014, not fully
covered by the Christiansen–Eskridge study, shows an even further decline in
45. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 155. Additionally, there were several cases which the
Christiansen–Eskridge study coded as containing hearing mentions that we were unable to find in
Westlaw’s legislative history materials or the Congressional Testimony database. See, for example,
McCleskey v. Zant, 488 U.S. 467 (1991), potentially overridden by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2244).
Although there are fifteen hearings linked to this statute on Westlaw, we did not find a reference to
“Zant” in any of them or in the Congressional Testimony database.
46. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110
Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (adding 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012)) (overriding Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
504 U.S. 1 (1992), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9–12 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012))
(overriding Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973)), and Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806)). The AEDPA in particular contributed to
making 1996 an outlier year. Christiansen–Eskridge found a full 14 overrides in the law. However,
1996 would remain an outlier even if the AEDPA were excluded altogether from the count.
47. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 252–55 app.1.
48. See id. at 209.
49. Id. The original Eskridge study identified an average of 12 overrides per two-year
congressional session for each two-year congressional period during the 1975–1990 period. See
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 335–36. Notably, this Eskridge 1991 study figure comes before the
Christiansen–Eskridge study supplemented this number with additional cases found through their
new methodology. We expect the number of overrides in 1975–1990 would increase significantly
for this period if we applied their new methodology to find more conscious overrides.
50. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 209.
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conscious overrides. With the resumption of divided government in 2011,
the average number of conscious overrides per two-year congressional
session fell to 2 through the end of 2014.51 In the last two years ending in
2014, we have identified only 2 conscious overrides by Congress using our
original methodology (the Christiansen–Eskridge methodology might
ultimately find a few more). They came in a technical bill benefiting the land
use of one Native American tribe.52
Figure 1 compares the original Hasen study of conscious overrides, the
Christiansen–Eskridge study of total overrides, and the revised Buatti–Hasen
numbers of conscious overrides for the 1991–2012 period
The biggest differences in the studies occur between 1994–1998, with
1996 remaining a clear outlier. Otherwise, the results track reasonably
closely. As revealed below, an unusually high number of “unmentioned”
cases occurred during these years, particularly in 1996. In addition, as
expected all three studies show a clear and marked decline in overrides from
2000 to the present times.

51. Using the Christiansen–Eskridge methodology for the 2012–2014 period no doubt could
pick up additional conscious overrides. We note that including the 2008–2010 Congress would
increase this number from 2 overrides per session to 4 overrides per session. We believe the
slightly higher number of overrides passed during the period of united government is consistent
with political polarization being a primary culprit in limiting overrides.
52. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014)
(overriding Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) and Pottawatomi v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199
(2012)). See H.R. REP. NO. 113-590, at 2 (2014) (“In 2009, the Supreme Court clarified that
Section 5 of IRA does not authorize the acquisition of land in trust for a tribe, such as Gun Lake,
whose members were not recognized and under federal jurisdiction on the date of enactment of
IRA, or June 18, 1934. Carcieri v. Salazar (555 U.S. 379 (2009)). . . . Accordingly, S. 1603 is
necessary for the Secretary to lawfully hold the Bradley Property in trust. . . . S. 1603 would void a
pending lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of the Secretary’s original action to acquire the Bradley
Property. The lawsuit, filed by a neighboring private landowner named David Patchak, has been
dormant for most of the last two years since the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Patchak’s standing to
pursue the action.”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-752, at 11 (2013) (“The bills would overturn the effects of
the Supreme Court decision by delegating authority to the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands
in trust for a tribe recognized at any time.”).
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B. The Uncertain Declining Value of Committee Reports
The second prong of our hypothesis concerned the diminished value of
committee reports. Although we did not limit our search to committee
reports, every scholar to have addressed this issue, including Hasen, appears
to agree that committee reports are decreasingly useful for most purposes.53
Christiansen and Eskridge’s detailed coding presented us with the
opportunity to run some preliminary tests to determine whether committee
reports truly had become less valuable in identifying overrides. We reasoned
that if these assumptions held true, we should expect to see fewer committee
report mentions in Christiansen and Eskridge’s data over time, with
“unmentioned” cases clustered in the 2001–2011 period.54 Recall that, for an
override to count as “unmentioned,” the legislative history must not discuss
(a) the override provision; or (b) the overridden Supreme Court case.
We began our analysis by examining the data that Christiansen and
Eskridge compiled for their original study, and that they shared with
Professor Widiss, which identified unmentioned cases during 1967–1990,
complementing it with Christiansen and Eskridge’s updated data for 1991–
2012. Figure 2 displays how unmentioned overrides mapped out over time:

53. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1328 (“We have found more overrides than the
2013 Hasen study did, especially for the 1990s. The paucity of overrides in his study is, in large
part, the result of the radical decline of committee reports as a useful source of information for
major legislation.”); Hasen, supra note 3, at 259; Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study,
92 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 205, 208 (2014); Widiss, supra note 7, at 151.
54. This hypothesis comes with the caveat that it may take time for courts to identify an
override. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1342–33. Thus, “unmentioned” overrides
from recent years could be underrepresented.
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Providing again that unmentioned overrides may be underrepresented in
these data for the latter several years, the results were somewhat surprising.
Although unmentioned overrides were indeed clustered in 1996, they were
otherwise fairly evenly distributed. This is consistent with our finding that,
with the significant exception of 1996 and to a lesser extent the surrounding
1994–1998 years, conscious overrides and total overrides track reasonably
closely. In addition, unmentioned overrides generally do not constitute a
very great proportion of total overrides, let alone a majority of total
overrides, for any given Congress after 1977. Even the spike in 1996 is
proportionally leveled out when considering the vast number of overrides
Christiansen and Eskridge found for that year. In Figure 3, we show the
proportion of unmentioned overrides to total overrides per year:

Because Christiansen and Eskridge designed their new methodology for
the purpose of catching unmentioned overrides (which everyone, including
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Hasen, expected to increase in the face of the “radical” decline in the value of
committee reports) we were surprised to see that unmentioned overrides had
not substantially increased over time, either absolutely or proportionally.
Finally, we wanted to see whether the results changed if “unmentioned”
referred only to overrides identified by the Christiansen–Eskridge study in
which the hearings and reports concerning the statute had no discussion of
the Supreme Court case overridden. That is, in this revised count we count
an override as unmentioned even if the legislative history material explicitly
referred to the override provision (without connecting it to a Supreme Court
case). This revised definition expanded the total number of unmentioned
overrides from 17 to 40. Figure 4 shows the total distribution of
Christiansen–Eskridge overrides in which the legislative history materials
make no reference to a Supreme Court case being overridden, and Figure 5
shows the proportion of such cases to total overrides.
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These results showed no discernable pattern. We see clusters of times in
which statutes whose legislative history did not mention an overridden
Supreme Court case spiked, passing the 40% mark for all overrides in their
respective years in 1992, 1996–1999, 2005, and 2010–2011. Aside from the
lack of a pattern, the overall numbers are very small and might simply be the
result of randomness. We would be very interested to see whether the same
general pattern applies since 1967. In any case, this preliminary evidence
does not show a steady increase in legislative history materials failing to
mention an overridden Supreme Court case.
C. Conclusion
We drew several conclusions from our empirical analysis. First, the
thoroughness (and labor intensiveness) of the Christiansen–Eskridge
methodology is difficult to overstate. Consistent with the first prong of our
hypothesis, their successful identification of 25 conscious overrides did
account for significant gaps in Hasen’s and Eskridge’s 1991 methodologies.
Relatedly, the Christiansen–Eskridge study methodology also produced a
large number of false positives in the form of unconscious overrides. This is
partially reflected in Figure 1, which concentrates unmentioned overrides
during Christiansen and Eskridge’s golden age of 1991–1999. While our
augmentation of the Hasen study does include more conscious overrides
during this period than initially thought, the decline from previous periods
means that 1991–1999 was not the golden age of conscious overrides.
Similarly, we agree with both the Christiansen–Eskridge study and the Hasen
study that all overrides, including both conscious and unconscious overrides,
have dropped precipitously in the last fifteen years.
The second prong of our hypothesis was more difficult to verify.
Applying the findings of the Widiss study along with Christiansen and
Eskridge’s updated data, we were not able to find an absolute or proportional
increase in the number of “unmentioned” overrides over time. Thus, we
were not able to confirm that the value of committee reports had declined, let
alone radically declined.
When we expanded the definition of
“unmentioned” to include all cases that did not discuss a corresponding
Supreme Court decision in a legislative committee report or hearing, we did
find clusters that could be consistent with a radical decline. However, we
were unable to verify this with a dataset that ranged from 1991–2012 only.
The Christiansen–Eskridge study’s methodology has been very useful in
catching a great many conscious overrides otherwise missed by Hasen’s and
Eskridge’s 1991 methodology. However, the radical diminution in the value
of committee reports in identifying overrides that their methodology was
designed to address is not clearly reflected in the override context. Instead,
the Christiansen–Eskridge methodology seems to solve a different problem:
the difficulty of using direct Westlaw database searches of legislative history
materials to find all conscious overrides. The labor-intensive ex post
approach of Christiansen–Eskridge is clearly better as a first cut.
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Political Polarization Means Few Overrides in Periods of Divided
Government

The Hasen study shows that the decline in conscious congressional
overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions corresponds neatly to
increased polarization in Congress. Specifically, with the demise of
moderates (especially Senate Republican moderates) in Congress, the
chances for bipartisan overrides seem to have fallen off a cliff. In its place is
a rise of partisan overrides (that is, overrides supported mostly by members
of one party) during brief periods of united government when the same party
controls the presidency and both Houses of Congress.55
The Christiansen–Eskridge study does not appear to disagree with the
conclusion that there has been a precipitous decline in overrides, although
they point to the decline happening a bit later (1998) than the Hasen study
(after 1991).56 The authors suggest that despite the “very significant falloff”57 in overrides and an acknowledgement that “there is no relief in
sight,”58 overrides could pick up again even as Congress remains divided and
polarized.
Christiansen and Eskridge may well be right that the number of
conscious and unconscious overrides of the Supreme Court’s statutory
interpretations could pick up again—a point on which we express no view.
But the authors offer no good reason to believe that in the near future the
numbers of solely conscious overrides will pick up except during periods of
united party government or that overrides will again become more bipartisan.
Consider two examples. First, contrast Congress’s bipartisan override of
two Supreme Court decisions in amending and extending the Voting Rights
Act in 200659 with its failure to come together to pass the Voting Rights
Amendments Act, which would update the Act’s coverage formula in light of
the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder60 to strike the
coverage formula as unconstitutional.61 Only eleven Republicans signed on
as co-sponsors of the 2014 version of the VRAA.62 The measure was

55. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 238–39.
56. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1331–32 (tracing Clinton impeachment as
beginning of overrides declining precipitously).
57. Id. at 1341.
58. Id. at 1473.
59. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 221–22 (describing passage of 2006 VRA amendments).
60. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
61. This is not a statutory override (it is rather a response to a constitutional ruling), but it is
similar enough to illustrate the point. On the lack of movement on the Voting Rights Amendments
Act, see Kate Nocera, Judiciary Chairman in No Rush to Move on Voting Rights Act Bill,
BUZZFEED (Jun. 26, 2014, 2:33 PM) http://www.buzzfeed.com/katenocera/judiciary-chairman-inno-rush-to-move-on-voting-rights-act-r, archived at http://perma.cc/HST6-S53F.
62. Cosponsors H.R.3899 - 113th Congress (2013-2014): Voting Rights Amendment Act of
2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3899/cosponsors,
archived at https://perma.cc/N9N3-Z2C7.
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supported almost exclusively by Democrats. Where there used to be
bipartisan support for the preclearance provision of the Act, even as far as the
mid-2000s, that support has withered away as more moderates have left
Congress and Congress has become even more polarized. Things have
gotten that much worse even in the last decade.
Second, Congress has not yet overriden the Supreme Court’s decision in
Paroline v. United States63 In Paroline, the Supreme Court interpreted a
federal statute allowing restitution for victims of child pornography to
recover only a small amount from the wrongdoers.64 The Senate in 2015
finally passed a bill on a 98–0 vote to overturn this Supreme Court case and
it awaits House approval.65 It seems like the perfect sort of case for a
bipartisan override: both parties like to be tough on child pornographers—it
is one issue on which there is no partisan divide. In the old days such
legislation seemed likely to quickly sail through Congress with bipartisan
support. These days, passage of even this uncontroversial bill is uncertain
given overall congressional gridlock.
Something has changed about the nature of conscious congressional
overrides, and, for reasons given in the Hasen study, the rise in partisanship
seems a likely explanation. Overrides have declined as voting in Congress
has become more ideological, the parties voting patterns became more
sharply divided, and ideological moderates have left Congress.
Christiansen and Eskridge, however, are not convinced that partisanship
is the main cause:
[Hasen’s] thoughtful analysis does not explain the pattern of overrides
we have found, however: Congress in the 1990s was much more
polarized than it was in the 1980s or 1970s, yet the 1990s was the
golden age of overrides. Were polarization the entire story, we would
expect overrides to decline as polarization increased, yet we see the
opposite: during the 1990s overrides increased during a time of
increasing polarization.66

The premise of the analysis is incorrect. As explained in Part III above,
the 1990s were not the golden age of conscious overrides, although there
were more overrides in that period than indicated in the original Hasen
study.67 Such overrides still declined after 1991, which marked the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversing at least 10 Supreme Court

63. Paroline v. United States, No. 12-8561, slip op. at 1710 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2014).
64. Id. at 21.
65. S. 295 Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2015,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s295.
66. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1344.
67. See supra Figure 1.
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opinions.68 The decline which began in 1992 increased dramatically during
the 2001–2014 period.69
More importantly, the amount of partisanship helps explain any
transitory bump in the 1990s. Despite the decade ending with the Clinton
impeachment and great partisan drama, the Presidents in the 1990s were
political moderates, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, who were willing to
make deals with the other party,70 a point on which Christiansen and
Eskridge agree.71 Further, in 1993 and 1994, President Clinton presided over
a united Democratic Congress.72 Both the moderation of the presidents and a
period of unified government can help explain any uptick in conscious
overrides in the 1990s, although they do not explain the 1996 spike.
The next two presidents did not fare as well with Congress on overrides
or legislation generally. After first giving President George W. Bush some
of what he wanted on his legislative agenda, Democrats eventually sought to
limit Bush initiatives.73 With fewer Republican moderates in Congress and
the rise of the Tea Party movement, Republicans from the beginning of the
Barack Obama presidency sought to block and weaken him despite his
ideological moderation (he was more moderate than George H.W. Bush,
Clinton, and George W. Bush),74 and few significant overrides occurred
during the Obama presidency.75 Conscious overrides are at the lowest point
since at least 1967, the start of the original Eskridge 1991 study.
From the 1970s to today, the ideological distance between the parties has
only grown, as the parties realigned after the civil rights movement and the
number of moderates in Congress has shrunk, shrinking even further with the
2014 election’s loss of Democratic Senate moderates such as Kay Hagan,
Mark Pryor, Mark Begich and Mary Landrieu.76 In a Senate with no Bob

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. As measured by DW-Nominate scores, President George H.W. Bush was more moderate
than President Reagan and his son, President George W. Bush. President Clinton was more
moderate than President Jimmy Carter, but President Obama is more moderate than Clinton. David
Dayen, New Study: Presidents Getting More and More Conservative, FIREDOGLAKE (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/06/new-study-presidents-getting-more-and-moreconservative/, archived at http://perma.cc/47E7-7H6V.
71. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1339.
72. CQ PRESS, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 83 (7th ed. 2013).
73. Dan Balz, Democrats are United in Plans to Block Top Bush Initiatives, WASH. POST (Jan.
5, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61686-2005Jan9.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/4G6L-7AT9.
74. Dayen, supra note 70.
75. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1480–81 (identifying few overrides during
President Obama’s term); see infra Appendix 1 (displaying congressional overrides during Obama’s
presidency).
76. Catalina Camia, Democrats Who Voted for Obamacare Cut By Half in New Senate, USA
TODAY (Dec. 8, 2014), http://onpolitics.usatoday.com/2014/12/08/democrats-senate-obamacarelandrieu/, archived at http://perma.cc/V4FG-UGG3.
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Doles and no Robert Byrds, but with a Ted Cruz and an Elizabeth Warren,
legislative compromise seems less likely. Aside from ideological distance
there is also an intransigence among many members of Congress, who see
compromise in order to pass legislation as a victory for the other side.
Christiansen and Eskridge agree that the remainder of the Obama
administration will see few overrides, but they suggest overrides will pick up
again, maybe after this decade, because of a need for Congress to update
statutes.77 No doubt there is such a need, but that does not mean Congress
rationally will respond to it. Christiansen and Eskridge offer no path for the
revival of overrides, acknowledging that they “have no solution” to stop the
decline in overrides, which they see as a “consequence of both Congress’s
post-9/11 agenda and its hyper partisan divisions.”78 We are similarly
pessimistic that in times of divided government, even post-Obama, a return
to major bipartisan overrides is possible. We will have to wait for
partisanship to ebb in Congress, whenever and however that may happen.
We hope it happens soon, but have no expectation that it will.
III. Conclusion
On one key point, the wonderful Christiansen–Eskridge study misses the
mark: when it comes to the Congress–Supreme Court dialogue, it makes the
most sense to limit the study of overrides to conscious ones. Considering all
three studies on this issue, as well as Professor Widiss’s analysis, there seems
little doubt that conscious congressional overrides of Supreme Court
statutory interpretation opinions have declined precipitously, especially since
2000, and polarization in Congress means this trend will continue, except in
limited periods of united government, until polarization diminishes.

77. “In the short term, i.e., the remainder of the Obama Administration, we see no realistic
possibility for a revival of statutory overrides, but in the medium and long term, they seem likely to
make a comeback simply because there is bipartisan need for legitimate updating of statutory
policy, which is the dominant story for overrides in the last two generations, but which have largely
disappeared since the Clinton impeachment.” Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1325 n.31.
See also id. at 1333 (“We do not consider the reduced level of override activity a permanent feature
of national governance, but it will probably continue for the remainder of the decade, and perhaps
longer.”).
78. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1474.
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Appendix 1: Conscious Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Cases, 1991–2014
Year
2014

2011
2011

2009

Congressional Act
Gun Lake Trust Land
Reaffirmation Act, Pub L. No.
113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014)
Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and
Venue Clarification Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 204, 125
Stat. 758
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21,
123 Stat. 1617
§ 2(f)(1)(B)
§ 4(a)

2009

2009
2008

Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101, 123
Stat. 1776, 1783–1830
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123
Stat. 5, 5–6
ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122
Stat. 3553, 3555–56

Supreme Court Case
Overruled
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S.
379 (2009)
Pottawatomi v. Patchak, 132 S.
Ct. 2199 (2012)
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535
U.S. 826 (2002)
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S.
335 (1960)

United States v. Santos, 553
U.S. 507 (2008)
Allison Engine Co. v. U.S. ex
rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662
(2008)
FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000)
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618
(2007)
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999)
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999)
Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999)

22

2007

2006
2006
2006

2005
2005
2005

2003

2002

2002
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Openness Promotes Effectiveness
in Our National Government Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, §
4, 121 Stat. 2524, 2525
Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, §
2(1), 120 Stat. 1730, 1730–32
Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §
7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks,
and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat.
577, 580–81.
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a), 119
Stat. 302, 310–11
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. 10, §
1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741–43
Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119
Stat. 4, 9–12

Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat.
650, 667–95
Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-147, § 402(a), 116 Stat.
21, 40
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 804(a), 116
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Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health
& Human Res., 532 U.S. 598
(2001)
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006)
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.
461 (2003)

Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001)
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004)
United Steelworkers of Am.,
AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny,
Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965)
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969)
Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973)
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806)
Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81 (1996)

Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S.
206 (2001)
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis
& Petigrow v. John Gilbertson,
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1999
1998
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Stat. 745, 801
Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112(a)(2),
114 Stat. 1464, 1486–90
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub.
L. 106-102, § 104(c)–(d), 113
Stat. 1338 (1999)
Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112
Stat. 685
§ 3001(a)
§ 3106(b)(1)
§ 3202(a)

1998

Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-297, § 3, 112 Stat. 2824,
2824

1998

Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-386, § 1(a), 112 Stat. 3469,
3469–70
Credit Union Membership Access
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, § 101,
112 Stat. 913, 914–17 (1998)
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788
§ 932(a)

1998
1997

§ 1282(a)
1996

Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
§ 104

§ 106
1996

False Statements Accountability

23

501 U.S. 350 (1991)
United States v. Kozminski,
487 U.S. 931 (1988)
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty.,
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25
(1996)

Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933)
United States v. Williams, 514
U.S. 527 (1995)
United States v. Brockamp, 519
U.S. 347 (1997)
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972)

Bailey v. United States, 516
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